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I. INTRODUCTION 
The publication now of an essay written by Craig Callen nearly a 
decade ago is cause for wistful celebration.  Even while we are reminded 
how suddenly and prematurely Craig’s life ended, it is good to have one more 
academic contribution from him, especially because it is marked by the 
erudition, thoroughness, gentleness, and humor that characterized him. 
Though Craig’s essay is a commentary on an approach to fact-finding 
presented by Michael Pardo and Ronald Allen, it discusses at some length 
problems that he perceived in what he called “mathematical models of 
inference from evidence.”  I am one of those who believes that standard 
probability analysis can be useful in thinking about some problems in 
juridical fact-finding.  I believe that speaking of “mathematical models” 
might tend to give a misleading view of the enterprise.  At least for the most 
part, we do not advocate introducing numbers into the analysis, or calling for 
jurors to make complex calculations, or any calculations for that matter.  But 
probabilistic reasoning can provide a useful heuristic for thinking of the fact-
finding process.  So first I will sketch the outlines of a probabilistic account 
of that process.  Then I will respond to Craig’s concerns, some of which are 
expressed by Pardo and Allen as well.  And then I will take the opportunity 
to join, belatedly, in the conversation about the Pardo and Allen approach. 
II. OUTLINES OF A PROBABILISTIC ACCOUNT 
I will begin by addressing the standard of persuasion.  This is the level 
of confidence the trier of fact must have that the facts favor claimant in order 
to find for that party.  (For simplicity, I will assume that the trier is a jury 
and the claimant is either a plaintiff or a prosecutor.) Conceptually, I believe, 
the problem is actually rather simple.  A trial requires a decision under 
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uncertainty, meaning that whichever decision one makes, there is a chance 
that the decision will be wrong.  Let’s focus on a simple, two-option 
decision—guilty or not guilty, liable or not liable.  The choice of standard 
will depend on a relative weighing of the harm caused by one wrong decision 
or another.  Suppose that Option One has far worse consequences if wrong 
than does Option Two.  Then a sensible decision-maker will choose Option 
One rather than Option Two only if she has a high degree of confidence that 
Option One rather than Option Two is correct, or, put another way, only if 
she thinks Option One is far more probable than Option Two. 
Criminal law clearly reflects this analysis.  The received (and justified) 
wisdom over centuries, in our system and in many others, has been that an 
incorrect conviction is many times worse than an incorrect acquittal,1 and so 
we tell the jurors not to enter a verdict of guilt unless they are virtually certain 
that the accused is in fact guilty; hence, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard.  In most civil cases, we say that an error favoring the defendant is 
about as bad as an error favoring the plaintiff.  The usually accepted rule is 
that to find for the plaintiff, the jury need only find that the facts more likely 
than not favor the plaintiff; the case of exact equipoise is decided in favor of 
the defendant, giving some weight (which I think should probably be 
considerably greater) to recognition of the inertial value of maintaining the 
status quo.  But in some civil cases, a pro-plaintiff error appears so much 
worse than a pro-defendant error that we impose an intermediate standard, 
usually articulated as “clear and convincing.”  And, for that matter, there are 
some decisions in which courts will grant relief even if the balance of 
probabilities is against the party seeking it.2 
Note that in describing these standards according to a probabilistic 
model,3 I have avoided using any numbers, because they are not necessary 
and courts do not ordinarily use them either.  But the concept of magnitude 
is essential.  It is not enough to say that the harm caused by an incorrect 
choice of Option One is greater than that caused by an incorrect choice of 
Option Two; to set the standard of persuasion appropriately, we need to have 
a sense of how much worse one error is than the other. 
 
* Richard D. Friedman, Alene and Allan F. Smith Professor of Law, The University of 
Michigan Law School. 
 1   See generally Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997) 
(providing a whimsical look at the matter, gathering many statements of the principle from a 
wide array of sources). 
 2 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2009) (“reasonable grounds to believe”). 
 3 I do not mean to argue that other considerations do not enter into the determination of 
whether a case has been sufficiently proven to be presented to the jury; I am agnostic on that.  
See Richard D. Friedman, Towards a (Bayesian) Convergence?, 1 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 
348, 351 (1997); see generally DALE A. NANCE, THE BURDENS OF PROOF: DISCRIMINATORY 
POWER, WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE, AND TENACITY OF BELIEF (2016). 
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Under this view, the job of the jury, once all the evidence is presented 
to it, may be thought of as asking a comparative question: “How probable is 
it that the evidence arose by a course of events that warrants a verdict for 
Party One as compared to a course of events that would warrant a verdict for 
Party Two?”  This approach is perfectly consistent with what has come to be 
called the “story model” of litigation.4 
So far I have spoken about what Pardo and Allen call the macro level.  
I’ll turn briefly, as they do, to what they call the micro level—the relevance 
and probative value of particular items of evidence.  I think we agree that 
relevance and probative value are essentially the same phenomenon, but that 
relevance is a binary term and probative value is a matter of degree;5 this is 
how Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, respectively, use the terms.  
Note that Rule 401 defines relevance in explicitly probabilistic terms: 
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make . . . more or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence” a fact that is “of 
consequence in determining the action.”6  This probabilistic orientation was 
not adventitious, and it reflected a deep-seated view, not the whimsy of 
latter-day modelers.  In a 1966 comment accompanying his first draft of the 
Rule, which in substance has remained essentially unchanged through the 
drafting process and ever since, the Reporter, Edward Cleary, noted that the 
draft’s approach was based on a 1941 article by George F. James, Relevancy, 
Probability and the Law.7 That article, Cleary said, “has been followed by 
most of the subsequent writers on the subject.”8  Indeed, James, in explaining 
how A’s design to kill B is relevant to the question of A’s guilt of killing B, 
takes an explicitly probabilistic view: “We cannot now say that A is probably 
guilty, but we can say that the apparent probability of his guilt is now greater 
than before the evidence of design was received.”9  And that, of course, ties 
in nicely with the overall structure of the trial, because the prosecutor is 
trying to show that, taking into account all the evidence and everything that 
we know material to the case, the probability of guilt is very high indeed. 
 
 
 4 See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: 
The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991).  I have discussed the compatibility of 
probabilistic and story models at some length in Infinite Strands, Infinitesimally Thin: 
Storytelling, Bayesianism, Hearsay and Other Evidence, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 79 (1992). 
 5  See Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 
LAW & PHIL. 223, 241–42 (2008). 
 6  FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 7  George F. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689 (1941). 
 8  RICHARD D.  FRIEDMAN & JOSHUA DEAHL, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: TEXT AND 
HISTORY 55 (2015). 
 9  James, supra note 7, at 699 (emphasis in original). 
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Advocates of a probabilistic analysis of fact-finding recognize that 
assignment of a probability to a given proposition is a subjective matter.  
They also recognize that jurors do not, and should not, usually go through 
prescribed algorithms in analyzing evidence.  Accordingly, the usefulness of 
probabilistic analysis depends only on the proposition that if a juror is doing 
her job well, she will act in accordance with certain fundamental principles.  
For example, all other things being equal,  the probability of a proposition as 
assessed given a particular piece of evidence will be higher: (1) the higher is 
the prior probability of that proposition – that is, the probability of the 
proposition as assessed without the evidence; and (2) the greater is the 
likelihood ratio of the evidence with respect to the proposition – that is, the 
ratio yielded by dividing (a) the probability that the evidence would arise 
given the truth of the proposition, by (b) the probability that the evidence 
would arise given the falsity of the proposition. 
III. CALLEN’S CONCERNS 
Callen raised several concerns about what he calls “mathematical 
models.”  I believe that none of these concerns undermine the analytical 
usefulness of probabilistic models, at least if they are kept within the 
confines suggested above.  I will address his points serially, though in a 
slightly different order than he did. 
First, Callen properly emphasized the importance of soft variables.10  
That would indeed be a concern if one asked a jury to reach a particular 
numerical assessment of probability on the basis of numerical evidence.  But 
there is no need that a probabilistic analysis asks for anything of the sort, and 
it can posit that jurors implicitly assign probabilities on the basis of non-
numerical information just as easily as it can posit that they do so  on the 
basis of hard data. 
Second, Callen emphasized, as he has before, the problem of 
computational complexity.11  I think there are several answers.  First, any 
model of fact-finding ought to be able to handle, as a theoretical matter, all 
the complexity in the world.  But that does not mean that jurors who are 
operating according to the model must use it in full force.  Indeed, they need 
not, and various simplifications and approximations make the task 
considerably easier.12  At the same time, commentators considering a 
 
 10  Craig R. Callen, Spotting A Preponderance Of The Evidence In The Wild: Inference 
To The Best Explanation And Sufficiency Of The Evidence, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1517 
(2018). 
 11  Id. at 1527.  I have responded at some length to this contention in Answering the 
Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 276, 288–90 (1997). 
 12  Peter Donnelly, Approximation, Comparison, and Bayesian Reasoning in Juridical 
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problem of proof can use as much complexity in their analysis as seems 
helpful.13 
Third, Callen pointed out that mathematical logic is reversible—that if, 
for example, one calculated a given probability but found that unappealing, 
one might reassign probabilities and recalculate “until satisfied that the result 
seems reasonable, and that the application of the theorem incorporates the 
relevant criteria.”14  True enough.  I am not sure that such a process of 
reflective equilibrium would be a problem even if one were suggesting that 
jurors followed an algorithm under which they assigned elemental 
probabilities and then, based on those assignments, assessed how probable 
the hypothesis of interest is in light of all the evidence; it might well make 
sense to take a second look and see if taken together all the assignments yield 
sensible results.  And particularly if one only expects the jury to compare the 
probabilities of stories, or of groups of stories, I think the process Callen 
suggested poses no problem at all. 
Fourth, Callen pointed to issues related to incompleteness of 
evidence.15  I agree that jurors must take into account not only the evidence 
that is presented to them but also the fact that certain types of evidence are 
not presented to them.  There is absolutely nothing in a probabilistic model 
that prevents jurors from inferring that if a given type of evidence favored 
the party with better access to it, that party would probably have presented 
it.  Nor does a probabilistic model prevent jurors from making that inference 
part of an overall assessment of the factual issue at stake. 
Fifth, Callen discussed the reference class problem—if one is trying to 
determine the probability that the bus that caused an accident belonged to a 
given company, is the most appropriate class to examine the buses in town, 
or those in town that got into accidents, or those that run on the street where 
the accident occurred, or something else?16  I agree that this would be a 
serious problem if one expected jurors to treat a datum as a probability—for 
example, “Eighty percent of the buses in town are blue, and therefore I 
believe that the probability that this accident was caused by a blue bus is 
80%.”  But a datum is just a piece of information; it is not a probability 
 
Proof, 1 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 304, 305–07 (1997); Answering the Bayesioskeptical 
Challenge, supra note 11, at 288–89. 
 13  See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibility and Hearsay, 96 YALE 
L.J. 667, 707–19 (1987) (using probabilistic analysis to assess probative value of, inter alia, 
statements of intent in proving subsequent actions of another); Richard Friedman, Character 
Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-bayesian [!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA 
L. REV. 637 (1991) (using probabilistic analysis to assess probative value of prior convictions 
with respect to credibility of witnesses). 
 14  Callen, supra note 10, at 1527. 
 15  Callen, supra note 10, at 1527. 
 16  Callen, supra note 10, at 1530. 
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assessment, which is a statement of a level of confidence in a given 
proposition.  There is no doubt that it can be a difficult and uncertain task to 
determine how to use a generalized datum in making a sensible assessment 
of the probability of a particularized proposition; one might well decide, for 
example, that even if most of the buses that run through town during the day 
are blue, that is not true of the particular time and place of the accident, and 
one might have reason to suspect that buses belonging to the Blue Bus 
Company are more (or less) likely than others to get into collisions.  But this 
is a real problem that inevitably confronts anyone who must make a decision 
given incomplete information; it is not a conceptual problem of a 
probabilistic analysis of such a situation. 
And finally, Callen raised the so-called problem of conjunction.17  The 
problem is thought to be this: Suppose that an ordinary civil claim consists 
of multiple elements, and the jury finds both that each of them is more likely 
than not true and that it is more likely than not that they are not all true.  What 
should happen in this circumstance?  Those who, like Callen, Pardo and 
Allen, are skeptical of probabilistic models of fact-finding believe that this 
situation poses a conundrum for a probabilistic account.  I believe the 
contention has been answered satisfactorily numerous times over the years.18  
The simple response is that triers of fact should be given a conjunctive 
instruction—that is, they should find for the plaintiff only if they find to the 
requisite level of confidence that all of the required elements are true.  (A 
finding that the plaintiff fails to meet that standard with respect to any one 
of the elements would immediately warrant a finding for the defendant, 
because then the conjunction could not meet the standard.)  Such an 
instruction would not conflict with any entrenched body of law; it may be 
that some jury instructions now given appear to call for a verdict for the 
plaintiff if each element meets the standard of persuasion, but there is no 
reason to believe that those who have crafted such instructions have carefully 
thought the matter through.  In any event, if the current law and the 
prescription of the probabilistic model were in genuine conflict on this 
 
 17  Callen, supra note 10, at 1529.   
 18  The matter was addressed, completely satisfactorily in my view, by Dale Nance more 
than thirty years ago in A Comment on the Supposed Paradoxes of a Mathematical 
Interpretation of the Logic of Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 947 (1986).  I have addressed it myself 
several times, including in Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & 
PROOF 276, 279–84 (1997).  A very thorough recent treatment, which I believe is completely 
in accord with the arguments made by Nance and me, is David S. Schwartz & Elliott Sober, 
The Conjunction Problem and the Logic of Jury Findings, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619 
(2017).  Another article that reaches essentially the same conclusion is Mark Spottswood, 
Unraveling the Conjunction Paradox, 15 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 259, 264 (2016) (arguing 
that factfinders should be instructed “that they should only find a defendant liable when the 
plaintiff has met the burden of persuasion for all of the elements taken together as a whole”) 
(emphasis in original). 
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question, the proper conclusion would be to recognize that the law is in error 
and should be changed, and to cheer for an instance of theoretical analysis 
improving prevailing doctrine. 
Callen responded by pointing out that a conjunctive instruction would 
raise the average probability of each element required for a plaintiff’s 
verdict; he said that “[i]t is difficult to see why the number of elements 
should affect the burden of persuasion for each or why the burden should be 
as high as .7 given the typical instruction.”19  (Pardo and Allen make the 
same point.20)  But the average required probability per element is a number 
of no particular significance.  And note that how many elements a claim is 
deemed to have is simply a matter of word choice.  One might think of 
“breach of duty” as a single element or as two elements, “existence of a duty” 
and “breach of that duty.”  The substance of the plaintiff’s burden should not 
depend on which choice of articulation the law makes.  So if we restate one 
element as two, it follows inevitably that the average probability per element 
that the plaintiff must demonstrate will increase—and that is of no concern 
whatsoever.  Suppose, for example, a plaintiff has to show as an element of 
his claim a continuous period of disability over a given period, say a year.  If 
instead we broke that element into 365 separate ones, one for each day, the 
substance of the claim would not change.  The average probability per 
element required for the plaintiff to prevail would increase, but that does not 
matter; the jury would likely conclude that if the plaintiff was disabled on 
any given day then it was almost certain that he was disabled on any closely 
proximate day.21 
 
 19  Callen, supra note 10, at 1529. 
 20  Pardo & Allen, supra note 5, at 253–54. 
 21  I discuss this point in considerable detail in Infinite Strands, supra note 4, at 97–98 
n.50.  Strangely, Pardo and Allen assert that under a conjunctive instruction, “[p]laintiffs’ 
likelihood of success will depend on how the claim is defined.”  Pardo & Allen, supra note 5, 
at 255.  They may be making two separate points.  First, if the same substance is broken into 
more elements, the average probability per element required for the plaintiff will increase.  As 
I have already indicated in the text, that is of no significance.  (I am not certain, but they may 
recognize this.)  Second, the average probability per element required for the plaintiff will 
also increase if an additional element is added to the legal requirements of the claim, so that 
the plaintiff’s task is made substantively more difficult.  But that is just as it should be.  
Compare a pair of simple card games.  In Game 1, there is a single pile of shuffled cards (not 
necessarily a full deck), and your job is to call “Red” if and only if you believe that a card 
chosen at random from the pile is more likely than not to be red.  You should make the call if 
and only if you believe that there are more red cards than black cards in the pile.  In Game 2, 
there are two shuffled piles, drawn from separate decks, and you should call “Red” if and only 
if you believe that it is more likely than not that two cards, one drawn at random from each 
pile, will both be red.  Obviously, now you should make the call only if you believe that the 
average probability of a red card being drawn from each pile is substantially greater than .5; 
to be more precise, the average must be greater than 2/2, or about .707.  That could occur if 
you believed that each pile had a proportion of red cards greater than that, or if you knew that 
one pile was all red and the other a little more red than black, or any combination in between.  
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Ultimately, Callen did appear to recognize that an instruction might 
require, for the plaintiff to win a verdict, only that the jury find the 
probability of “all of the elements of the claim” to be greater than .5.  But, 
he said, prescribing this means only that “mathematical models . . . cannot 
be used for anything more detailed than a global assessment of the 
evidence.”22  The conclusion does not follow.  All the jury needs to find, and 
all it should be instructed to find, is whether the probability of the 
conjunction of the elements is greater than the prescribed standard of 
persuasion.  But that does not limit what the probabilistic analysis can be 
used for.  One can, if it seems useful for any purpose, use the probabilistic 
approach to analyze the probability of a given element or the effect on the 
whole case, or on an element, of a given piece of evidence. 
In short, I do not find that any of Callen’s arguments should make us 
hesitate to use a probabilistic model of the fact-finding process, or to use 
probabilistic reasoning in attempting to make careful analysis of particular 
problems of proof. 
IV. INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION 
The approach presented by Pardo and Allen—labeled “PAT” by 
Callen—is an application to the juridical context of the practice known in 
philosophy as inference to the best explanation, or IBE.  As applied by Pardo 
and Allen to proof at trial, IBE proceeds in two stages. First is generation of 
competing explanations for the evidence presented at trial; this is primarily 
the work of the parties, but Pardo and Allen acknowledge that fact-finders 
are not limited to the explanations put forward by the parties.23  Second is 
determination of which party the best explanation favors.24 
 
There is nothing strange about this.   
          Pardo and Allen assert that “counterintuitive results pose a serious challenge to the 
Bayesian approach.” Pardo & Allen, supra note 5, at 255.  But they have failed to present any 
results that are actually counterintuitive.  For a fuller discussion of what Allen apparently 
thinks are “weird” results, see Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, supra note 11, at 
281–82. 
 22  Callen, supra note 10, at 1530. 
 23  Pardo & Allen, supra note 5, at 234.  This appears to me to be a welcome change of 
view from an earlier work of Allen’s, in which he said trials should be conceived of “as 
comparing the probability of the fully specified case of the plaintiff to the probability of the 
equally well specified case of the defendant.”  Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil 
Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401, 425 (1986). 
 24  There is ambiguity in speaking of the best explanation; if each of multiple accounts 
differs in some details but under the governing law each would lead to the same result, should 
they be considered to be separate explanations or just alternative parts of the same 
explanation?  Allowing a party to benefit from the aggregation of such accounts makes sense, 
and squares with the probabilistic account I have outlined, but it seems in tension with the 
idea of identifying the best explanation or, as Allen has previously articulated the parties’ 
responsibility, see Allen, supra note 23, at 425, presenting “fully specified” accounts.  
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What makes one explanation better than another?  Pardo and Allen say 
there are “objective criteria” for evaluating explanations: “For example, of 
two explanations, all other things being equal, the one that explains more of 
the evidence will be better than the one that explains less; the one that is 
more in accord with what else we know will be better than the one that is 
not; and so on.”25  I do not find this satisfying.  Even if one had a good metric 
for determining what it means to say that one account explains more of the 
evidence than does another (or, what I think would be more comprehensible, 
to say that one account better explains the evidence than does another26) or 
that one is more in accord with what else we know than another,27 and even 
if we knew how to put together these and other, unidentified, assertedly 
“objective criteria” for determining which of two explanations is better, we 
should ask what makes these particular criteria matter to the judicial system.  
It seems to me that the answer is that these factors tend to make one account 
more probable than the other. 
Pardo and Allen might seem at one point to acknowledge this, because 
they suggest that in the ordinary civil case, the best explanation is “the most 
plausible version of the litigated events.”28  Actually, though, they are 
determined to show that cardinal probabilities are not a useful basis for 
thinking about the juridical fact-finding process.29  The standard of 
persuasion as usually articulated in the ordinary civil case shrouds a problem, 
because if one takes seriously the idea that the plaintiff should win if the 
balance of probabilities tilts at all in his favor, by no matter how small an 
amount, then one need not worry about magnitude; for a verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff to be justified, it is enough that the pro-plaintiff account be just 
 
Accordingly, I have been perplexed in the past as to whether, or the extent to which, Allen 
would allow aggregation of such accounts.  See, e.g., Infinite Strands, supra note 4, at 93–94 
n.40.  Allen has previously criticized “bunching” as part of a Bayesian explanation of fact-
finding.  E.g., Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of 
Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1507 (2001).  But now Pardo and Allen appear to be fully on 
board with the idea of aggregating factually different accounts among which “the substantive 
law is indifferent.” Pardo & Allen, supra note 5, at 236–37.  So I am glad to see this apparent 
disagreement removed.  And the removal is, I believe one factor among several that brings 
Pardo and Allen’s IBE approach closer to the probabilistic one. 
 25  Pardo & Allen, supra note 5, at 245. 
 26  As I have suggested above, it seems to me that to have a chance of persuading the jury, 
any given theory of the facts of the case must purport to account for all of the evidence.  Does 
an asserted eyewitness testify that the accused committed the crime?  Perhaps that testimony 
is perjured.  Does DNA evidence appear to demonstrate that the accused was the source of a 
blood stain found at the scene of the crime?  Perhaps samples were mixed up in the lab.  Some 
explanations, of course, will be more persuasive than others. 
 27  I suppose my standard for determining that one account is more in accord with what 
else we know than is another would be that, given everything we know, the first account is 
more probable than is the other.  But I doubt that is what Pardo and Allen mean. 
 28  Pardo & Allen, supra note 5, at 266 (emphasis added). 
 29  Pardo & Allen, supra note 5, at 261. 
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slightly more probable than the pro-defendant account.30 
But outside that context, the shroud does not hold.  In the criminal 
context, Pardo and Allen  contend that juries should be instructed according 
to such formulations as “whether there is a plausible explanation or version 
of events consistent with innocence.”31 These formulations seem perfectly 
reasonable to me—but, as Pardo and Allen acknowledge, they do not reflect 
a process of inference to the best explanation.32  So the IBE approach, it 
appears, suffers itself from a lack of parsimony of explanation—the theory 
does not apply, at least without substantial adjustment, outside the context of 
the ordinary civil case.  And why should a different standard—and in their 
view, a different approach to selecting a standard—apply in the criminal 
case?  Pardo and Allen address this question only fleetingly and in a footnote, 
but what they say is intriguing: 
 
IBE is, at root, based on the notion that explanatory success tracks 
likelihood of truth—the better the explanation, the more likely 
true.  Because the criminal standard distributes errors unevenly (in 
favor of the defendant), it should not be surprising that the quality 
of the explanation needed for a pro-defendant verdict should 
therefore be lower.33 
 
Well, wait a minute.  So the ultimate aim appears to be assessing “likelihood 
of truth,” and in cardinal terms.  That sounds pretty much like probability.  
And why is a relatively low probability of innocence sufficient to justify a 
verdict for the defendant?  Because, they say, our system has decided to 
distribute errors unevenly in favor of the defendant—which I take as 
intending to say that our system regards a pro-defendant error as of much 
lower magnitude harm than a pro-prosecution error.34  And if that is not why, 
what other plausible reason is there for setting such a pro-defendant standard 
of persuasion?  Pardo and Allen offer none.  So we see a large differential in 
the magnitude of types of error together with a resultant low probability for 
 
 30  In speaking of the pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant accounts, I am implicitly assuming 
aggregation of all pro-plaintiff accounts and of all pro-defendant accounts.  See supra note 
24. 
 31  Pardo & Allen, supra note 5, at 267. 
 32  Pardo & Allen, supra note 5, at 239 n.45. 
 33  Pardo & Allen, supra note 5, at 239 n.45. 
 34  I do not think their articulation is quite accurate.  The aim of our system should not be 
to create any particular distribution of errors; that distribution will depend in part on the 
population of cases.  The aim instead is to minimize the total cost of errors, and a way to think 
of doing that is to move in a pro-defendant direction until the marginal cost of pro-defendant 
errors caused equals the marginal benefit of pro-prosecution errors avoided.  In one private 
conversation, Allen told me this point was gibberish; in a later communication, he said that it 
was correct and that he had made it before.  Whatever. 
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a standard of persuasion.  It’s beginning to look a lot like a probabilistic 
account, everywhere you go. 
The apparent congruence with a probabilistic model becomes even 
more pronounced when one considers intermediate standards such as “clear 
and convincing.”  Pardo and Allen acknowledge that the jury should not find 
in favor of a party bearing such a burden merely because the best explanation 
among available ones favors that party.  Instead, the explanation favoring 
that party must be “sufficiently more plausible” than others—that is, “clearly 
and convincingly more plausible than those favoring the other side.”35  And 
this is not circular, they say, because it simply reflects the nature of the “clear 
and convincing” standard; the  explanation must be “good enough to cause 
and justify the desired inference.”36 That appears to be a clear appeal to 
cardinality—to degrees of “plausibility,” most easily understood as ordinary 
probability.37  So the proposed standard seems to be something close to 
“clearly more probable than others.”  And why should our system adopt such 
a standard in a given type of case?  Presumably the reason is that an error on 
one side is considered substantially worse than an error on the other side (but 
not by as great a margin as in a criminal case); if they have another 
explanation, Pardo & Allen do not offer it. 
Now consider Pardo and Allen’s treatment of individual items of 
evidence.  They quote in a footnote, but then ignore, the “more probable or 
less probable” language of Rule 401.38  In their view, evidence is relevant “if 
it is explained by” a given explanation and “in turn justifies that explanation 
as correct, assuming the explanation concerns a fact that matters to the 
substantive law.”39  But what does that mean?  I do not think it is consistently 
useful to say that a given account “explains” a piece of evidence, and a single 
piece of evidence does not in itself usually “justify” a given account. For 
example, if a witness says that the assailant was about 6’2”, I believe it is 
rather strained to say that the hypothesis that the accused was the assailant 
explains evidence that the accused is 6’2”, and it seems to be an 
overstatement to say that the evidence justifies the hypothesis.  But it is 
perfectly comprehensible and sensible to say that the evidence makes the 
hypothesis more probable than it was before the evidence.  And that, of 
course, ties in nicely with the overall structure of the trial, because the 
prosecutor is trying to show that—taking into account all the evidence and 
 
 35  Pardo & Allen, supra note 5, at 239–40. 
 36  Pardo & Allen, supra note 5, at 240 n.46. 
 37  See Richard D. Friedman, “E” Is for Eclectic: Multiple Perspectives on Evidence, 87 
VA. L. REV. 2029, 2047 (2001). 
 38  Pardo & Allen, supra note 5, at 242 n.53.  Since Pardo and Allen published their 
article, this language has been amended for style, by deleting the first “probable.” 
 39  Pardo & Allen, supra note 5, at 241. 
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everything we know that is material to the case—the probability of guilt is 
very high indeed.  I do not believe that putting the relationship between the 
evidence and the hypothesis in the terms that Pardo and Allen favor offers 
anything useful that is not already achieved by speaking in probabilistic 
terms. 
* * * 
There is much more that can be said, but this is supposed to be a brief 
essay.  Silence on other points does not suggest assent.  I do not believe that 
Callen’s piece undermined the usefulness of a probabilistic model of fact-
finding, and I am not sure that Pardo and Allen’s invocation of IBE adds 
anything useful that is not already captured by such a model.  But this is an 
ongoing conversation, and I suppose it will continue; I am just sorry that 
Craig Callen’s voice will no longer be a part of it. 
 
